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Abstract
We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have di¤ering relative
intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels payo¤s
that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the
equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a
pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.
JEL Classication: C72, D7, P16
1 Introduction
The Colonel Blotto game was rst proposed by Borel (1921). In such a game, two colonels
ght over a number of battleelds and must simultaneously divide their forces among the
various battleelds. A battleeld is won by the one with the most troops and the winner
is the colonel that wins the most battleelds. The game was initially studied by Borel
(1921), Borel and Ville (1938) and Gross and Wagner (1950). It follows immediately
from the formulation of the game that there (generally) is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Recently, Roberson (2006) has fully characterized the mixed strategy equilibria when
troops are perfectly divisible and Hart (2008) has done likewise when the action space is
discrete.
Despite the variety of formulations of the game (discrete versus continuous forces, equal
or unequal forces), the Colonel Blotto game is a zero-sum game where all regions are
equally valued by both colonels, and a gain by one colonel means a loss of equal size
We thank Antonio Cabrales and Antoni Rubi for helpful comments.
for the other colonel.1 In this paper we analyze the game in which opposing parties
have di¤ering relative intensities. In contrast with the classical example, strict Pareto
improvements may now exist: a colonel may accept losing a battleeld if that implies
winning a battleeld that is of more value to him. By allowing di¤ering relative intensities,
we depart from the zero-sum nature of the game and characterize the sets of payo¤s that
support the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when both colonels are endowed
with an equal number of indivisible troops. We prove that there can be at most a single
pure strategy equilibrium and provide a simple algorithm that reaches the pure strategy
equilibrium actions (whenever they exist). Finally, we show that the set of games with
pure strategy equilibrium is non empty.
Our work relates to a burgeoning literature on voting and conict resolution that proposes
a new mechanism that allows agents to extract gains from the inherent heterogeneity in
their preferences (see for instance Casella (2005), Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007), and
Hortala-Vallve (2007)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game. Section 3.1
characterizes the set of voting proles which can constitute an equilibrium, Section 3.2
introduces an algorithm that reaches equilibrium whenever this exists and Section 3.3
describe the games which have equilibrium in pure strategies. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Its wartime. Two colonels, each on command of T troops are ghting for the control
of N separate battleelds. They both know that the one that deploys most troops in
a battleeld wins that battleeld. We want to characterise the optimal deployment of
troops.
Colonels are denoted i 2 f1; 2g and battleelds are denoted n 2 f1; 2; :::Ng. Colonel is
payo¤ from winning battleeld n is denoted in > 0; when he loses battleeld n his payo¤
is 0. The payo¤ vector of colonel i is denoted i =
 
i1; :::; 
i
N
 2   RN . The total war
payo¤ for each colonel is the sum of the individual payo¤s across the N battleelds.2
The set of actions for each colonel is the collection of deployment proles:
T :=
n
(t1; :::; tN ) 2 f0; 1; :::; TgN : t1 + :::+ tN = T
o
1There are two exceptions in which the nature of the game is non-zero sum. Kvasov (2006) characterizes
the equilibrium when the allocation of forces is costly and both colonels have exactly the same number of
troops. Roberson and Kvasov (2008) extend the analysis to cases in which the colonelsnumber of troops
di¤er.
2 Implicit in this denition of payo¤s is the assumption that valuations are independent across battle-
elds. That is, there are no complementarities between them. If this assumption holds, results can be
extended to any linear transformation of the payo¤s.
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The winner in each battleeld is the colonel that deploys the most troops. We assume
that ties (when both colonels deploy the same number of troops) are broken with the toss
of a fair coin. That is,8><>:
t1n > t
2
n ) colonel 1 wins battleeld n
t1n < t
2
n ) colonel 2 wins battleeld n
t1n = t
2
n ) each colonel wins battleeld n with probability 12 .
3 Games with pure strategy equilibria
We want to characterize the set of games that have (at least one) pure strategy equilibrium
when there are more than two battleelds (N > 2) and a strictly positive number of troops
(T > 0).3 Our argument follows three steps. Firstly, we determine which deployment
proles can constitute an equilibrium. Secondly, we describe an algorithm that reaches
the pure strategy equilibrium (when this one exists). Finally, we characterize the set
of payo¤s that support the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium and show that this
equilibrium is unique.
3.1 Equilibrium actions
Our rst step towards characterizing the non zero-sum Colonel Blotto games which have
a pure strategy equilibrium relies on distinguishing the set actions that can be part of an
equilibrium. The following denitions anchor two ideas that are key in our analysis.
Denition 1 Given both colonelsdeployment of troops,
 the troops of colonel i in battleeld n, tin, are decisive when deploying less troops
implies a di¤erent outcome in such battleeld4
 there is a positive tie in battleeld n when tin = tjn and tin > 0
The following Lemma establishes that there cannot be non decisive armies in a battleeld
when ties occur in (at least) one battleeld. If this is not the case, one of the colonels has
a protable deviation by deploying non decisive troops in the battleeld where ties occur.
These extra resources undo the tie and ensure a further victory for the deviating colonel.
3The cases with less than three battleelds are trivial. When N = 1, all troops are deployed in the
unique battleeld and ties occur. When N = 2, colonels deploy all their troops in the battleeld that
yields highest payo¤: when the colonels preferred battleeld coincide, ties occur on both battleelds;
otherwise, each colonel wins his preferred battleeld.
4This idea is analogous to the idea of a pivotal vote in voting games.
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Lemma 1 Assume there is a pure strategy equilibrium t 2 T T . When ties occur in
(at least) one battleeld, only one troop is deployed in the battleelds that are won by
either colonel. Formally, 9n;m : tin = tjn and tim 6= tjm then tim + tjm = 1.
Proof. Whenever a colonel loses a battleeld, all troops he deploys in that battleeld
are non-decisive. It thus follows that in any pure strategy equilibrium with (at least) one
battleeld tied, such colonel should deploy 0 troops in the lost battleeld. In turn, the
winning colonel should only deploy a single troop, should all his troops be decisive on the
won battleeld.
We can now characterize the types of troop deployments that can be observed in battle-
elds that are tied.
Lemma 2 Assume there is a pure strategy equilibrium t 2 T T . When positive ties
occur in more than one battleeld, both colonels deploy a single troop in all battleelds
where positive ties occur. Formally, 9n;m : tin = tjn > 0 and tim = tjm > 0 then tin = tim =
1.
Proof. We prove this Lemma by contradiction. Assume that there is an equilibrium
with positive ties in two battleelds and strictly more than one troop in, say, battleeld
n. That is, tin = t
j
n  2 and tim = tjm. First note that all battleelds with positive ties
should yield the same payo¤; otherwise any colonel has a protable deviation by diverting
the troops from the least preferred battleeld to the most preferred battleeld.
Any colonel can deviate 2 troops from battleeld n and obtain a higher payo¤. The rst
troop can be deployed in battleeldm by which the overall payo¤does not change (instead
of tying battleelds n and m now the colonel wins battleeld m and loses battleeld n).
The second troop can now be deployed in a territory that is tied or one that is lost (by
Lemma 1 territories can only be lost by one vote) thus obtaining a strictly higher payo¤.
The previous results fully characterize the equilibria when T is small: few troops imply
that a non-decisive vote can always be used for breaking a tie or reaching a tie in a
battleeld lost 1-0 (i.e. the losing colonel deploys no troops and the winning colonel
deploys a single troop). The previous results also imply that when T is large there can
never be an equilibrium with positive ties in more than one battleeld. This is because
in all positive ties both colonels need to invest a single troop and battleelds that are not
tied should only have a troop from one of the colonels. However, if T is large enough,
there are not enough battleelds where all troops can be deployed thus there should be a
battleeld tied with a large number of troops. The following Lemma further characterizes
the equilibrium voting proles when T is large.
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Lemma 3 When T > N2 , all pure strategy equilibria, t
 2 T T , have (at least) a
battleeld with positive ties. When more than one positive tie occurs it should be the case
that only one troop per colonel is deployed in each of the battleelds with positive ties.
Proof. The proof of the second statement is analogous to the one in Lemma 2. We
now prove the rst statement by contradiction: we assume that there is a pure strategy
equilibrium without positive ties. Having more troops than half the battleelds (T > N2 )
implies that there are non-decisive votes. This implies that ties cannot occur in any
battleeld and every battleeld needs to be won by one of the colonels. We now show that
each colonel can win at least half of the battleelds (step 1) but such conguration implies
that all battleelds are won with a single troop deployed in them (step 2). However, the
latter assertion together with not having positive ties (inductive assumption) implies that
the assumed equilibrium prole cannot constitute an equilibrium when T > N2 .
Step 1: Assume there is an equilibrium
 
t1; t2

such that colonel 1 wins the battleelds
indexed from 1 to k, and colonel 2 wins the remaining ones (indexed k+1 to N). Consider
a situation where colonel 2 only deploys the necessary votes to win battleelds k+1 to N .
This is, ~t2n = t
1
n+1, for n = k+1; :::; N . Colonel 1 needs a strictly higher number of troops
than colonel 2 in battleelds 1 to k so that ~t2 is not a protable deviation for colonel 2,
i.e. t11 + ::: + t
1
k  k +
 
~t21 + :::+ ~t
2
k

. Using the denition of ~t2n and the fact that any
colonel disposes of T troops, we know that the previous inequality can only be sustained
when k  N2 . Therefore, if
 
t1; t2

is an equilibrium it must be the case that none of the
colonels wins more than N2 battleelds. Whenever N is odd, this proves our result: no
colonel can win more than N2 battleelds but this implies that there is a battleeld where
ties occur and this contradicts our inductive hypothesis.
Step 2: Assume
 
t1; t2

is a pure strategy equilibrium where both colonels win exactly
half the battleelds when N is even (w.l.o.g. assume colonel 1 wins battleelds 1 to
N
2 ). The troops not deployed in battleelds
N
2 + 1 to N by colonel 2 need to be strictly
smaller than the troops deployed by colonel 1 in any of the rst N2 battleelds. That is,
T  

t2N
2
+1
+ :::+ t2N

< t1n;8n = 1; :::; N2 . We can rewrite this expression as:
t11 + :::+ t
1
N
2
<
N
2
+ t1n;8n = 1; :::;
N
2
:
The equality above implies that any sum of (N   1) colonel 1s troops in the rst half of
the battleelds is strictly less than N2 . The fact that this very same colonel wins those
battleelds implies that he should be deploying at least one troop in each of them thus
the sum needs to be equal to N2   1. This implies that t11 = ::: = t1N
2
= 1 but this is not
an admissible conguration when T > N2 .
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The situation where more than one battleeld is tied requires colonels to be indi¤erent
amongst battleelds where positive ties occur. Imagine for instance a situation with three
battleelds that are equally valued by both colonels (i.e. i1 = 
i
2 = 
i
3 for i = 1; 2). It
can easily be shown that when T = 3 the unique pure strategy equilibrium has each
colonel deploying a single troop in each battleeld. However, both colonels deploying one
troop each in the rst battleeld and two troops each in the second battleeld does not
constitute an equilibrium.
We can illustrate the above results following the previous example with 3 troops and bat-
tleelds (N = T = 3) but allowing any payo¤ per battleeld. The deployment
 
t1; t2

=
((1; 2; 0) ; (0; 1; 2)) can never constitute an equilibrium (regardless of the colonelspayo¤s).
This is because colonel 2 can protably deviate by deploying one troop from the third
battleeld into the rst (or second) battleeld. The following list displays the only ten
deployment proles that can constitute a pure strategy equilibrium (note that we should
have grouped all permutations of identical proles)
  t1; t2 = ((1; 1; 1) ; (1; 1; 1))
  t1; t2 = ((2; 1; 0) : (2; 0; 1)) or ((2; 0; 1) : (2; 1; 0)) or ((1; 2; 0) : (0; 2; 1)) or ((0; 2; 1) : (1; 2; 0))
or ((1; 0; 2) : (0; 2; 1)) or ((0; 1; 2) : (1; 2; 0)).
  t1; t2 = ((3; 0; 0) ; (3; 0; 0)) or ((0; 3; 0) ; (0; 3; 0)) or ((0; 0; 3) ; (0; 0; 3))
This example shows how the previous three Lemmas have greatly simplied the char-
acterization of the games that have a pure strategy equilibrium in a game with three
battleelds.5 As we increase the number of battleelds (and troops) the gains increase
exponentially. We now need to show the payo¤ congurations that support such deploy-
ment of troops as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
3.2 An algorithm to deploy troops
We consider an algorithm that instructs colonels on how to allocate their T troops sequen-
tially. In each iteration of the algorithm, both colonels simultaneously deploy one troop
in the battleeld they most value (amongst the battleelds each colonel is not winning).
This algorithm reaches a unique deployment prole when colonels are never indi¤erent
among battleelds. However we need to add a couple of renements to address the cases
of indi¤erence (these renements will allow the reach of a deployment prole that is the
unique pure strategy equilibrium when it exists). To illustrate these cases we consider
5The set of deployment proles for both colonels contains 100 elements. The previous three Lemmas
show that only 10 of them can constitute a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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once again a situation with three battleelds and three troops where the colonelspayo¤s
are:t1 = (7; 4; 1) and t2 = (2; 5; 5). Without having a rule, the algorithm may reach the
deployment prole (1; 2; 0) for one of teh colonels and (0; 1; 2) for the other colonel this
prole is not an equilibrium. However, we could have also reached the deployment prole 
t1; t2

= ((1; 2; 0); (0; 2; 1)) that indeed constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium (below
we will show that this is the unique equilibrium). The renement that allows us to select
the second deployment prole reads as follows: whenever a colonel reaches an iteration
in which he is indi¤erent among various battleelds he deploys his troops in the battleeld
least preferred by his opponent (among those to which he is indi¤erent). The second
renement helps the colonel to allocate his troop when the rst renement still leaves him
indi¤erent among various battleelds: when there is not a single battleeld that is least
preferred by his opponent (among those to which the colonel is indi¤erent) the colonel
should deploy his troop in the battleeld where least troops have been deployed. This last
requirement allows to evenly distribute troops when colonels are indi¤erent among many
battleelds and allows them to reach the unique equilibrium when both colonels equally
value all battleelds.
The previous algorithm (together with the two renements) allows colonels to deploy all
their troops. Moreover, the nal deployment of troops is uniquely determined (except for
some cases when there is indi¤erence among battleelds). Most interestingly, the following
proposition states that whenever there is a pure strategy equilibrium, the algorithm above
reaches such allocation.
Proposition 1 Consider a non-zero Colonel Blotto game with a pure strategy equilib-
rium. The algorithm where each colonel simultaneously deploys a single troop at a time
in the battleeld he values most among those that he is not winning (and in case of indif-
ference, the battleeld that is least valued by his opponent and/or the battleeld in which
there are less troops) reaches the pure strategy equilibriums deployment proles.
Proof. We rst need to consider all deployment proles that can be sustained as a
pure strategy equilibrium (Lemma 1, 2, and 3) and show which payo¤ congurations
can sustain such deployment proles. Once this is done we can show that the described
algorithm reaches such deployment conguration.
First, we consider the situation where there is a pure strategy equilibrium with all bat-
tleelds are won 1   0 or tied 0   0. These deployment proles are an equilibrium only
when the battleeld each colonel wins is valued strictly more than those he does not
win. This implies the algorithm reaches exactly the same allocation as the pure strategy
equilibrium.
Second, we consider the situation where there is a pure strategy equilibrium with at
least two battleelds with positive ties and where the remaining battleelds that are won
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1   0 or tied 0   0. We rst note that a colonels payo¤s from the battleelds that are
positively tied need to be equal. These payo¤s need to be (strictly) greater than the
payo¤s from battleelds that are lost or tied 0   0; and (strictly) lower than the payo¤s
from battleelds that are won. When the algorithm is run, colonels rst allocate their
troops into the battleelds they most prefer (i.e. battleelds whose outcome is 1   0).
At one point during the algorithm, each colonel has as many non-deployed troops as
battleelds most valued and not won by any colonel; moreover, this set of battleelds
yield the same payo¤ to each colonel. The algorithms second renement implies that ties
with one troop occur in all these battleelds (i.e. 1  1).
Third (and last), we consider the situation where there is a pure strategy equilibrium
with a unique battleeld with positive ties, the remaining battleelds are won 1   0 or
tied 0   0: Once again, the battleelds that are won are valued strictly more than those
that are positively tied. And the latter should be valued more than the battleelds that
are lost. The algorithm requires troops to be deployed in the battleelds that are most
valued. The battleeld positively tied is valued strictly more than the lost battleelds,
thus colonels continue to simultaneously deploy a single troop into that same battleeld
because it is the most preferred among the battleelds each colonel is not winning.
We must recall that the previous result states that our algorithm reaches a pure strategy
equilibrium when this one exists. It is easy to show that our algorithm does not always
reach a pure strategy equilibrium. For instance, when payo¤s are 1 = (5; 4; 3) and
2 = (7; 3; 2) the allocation reached by our algorithm has all troops of both colonels
deployed in the rst battleeld. However, the rst colonel has a protable deviation: he
could deploy half his troops in battleeld 2 and the other half in battleeld 3. It follows
from the previous Proposition that a game with such a payo¤ conguration cannot have
a pure strategy equilibrium.
An interesting question that arises when analyzing our algorithm is whether the allocation
it reaches constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the extensive game where
each colonel simultaneously deploys a single troop in each stage of the game. The previous
example answers this question negatively: our algorithm does not reach a subgame perfect
equilibrium in the extensive game. However, when a pure strategy equilibrium exists in
the simultaneous game, the algorithm reaches the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
game where each colonel repeatedly (and simultaneously) deploy a single troop.
Lemma 4 Consider a non-zero Colonel Blotto game with a pure strategy equilibrium.
The algorithm where each colonel simultaneously deploys a single troop at a time in the
battleeld he values most among the ones he is not winning (and in case of indi¤erence,
the one that is least valued by his opponent and/or has less troops deployed in it) is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive form game with T stages where each colonel
simultaneously deploys a single troop in each stage of the game.
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Proof. We need to show that the algorithm prescribed actions indeed constitute a Nash
equilibrium (NE) in all subgames of the extensive form game.
Using Proposition 1, we know that the deployment prole reached by the algorithm is
a NE. Now we need to consider all other subgames. At any subgame or iteration of
our algorithm we can drop the battleelds that have been won by any of the agents
(when a pure strategy equilibrium exists, these battleelds play no role in the allocation
of subsequent troops). By doing so we have a reduced colonel Blotto game with less
battleelds; in addition, all remaining battleelds are tied.6 Using once again Proposition
1 we know that the algorithm reaches the unique equilibrium of the reduced game, thus
the prescribed actions in our algorithm are indeed a NE in all subgames of our extensive
game.
Whenever the game has non-pure strategy equilibrium the deployment prole reached by
the algorithm is trivially non subgame perfect because it does not constitute an equilib-
rium of the game.
3.3 Characterization of games with pure strategy equilibrium
Proposition 1 tells us that a necessary condition for the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium is that the algorithm reaches an admissible deployment prole (see Lemmas
1, 2, and 3). This prole requires battleelds to be won by one troop or tied. Besides, in
a pure strategy equilibrium a colonel that wins a battleeld should obtain a higher payo¤
from that battleeld than from the battleelds he ties. In turn, he should obtain a higher
payo¤ from the battleelds he ties than from the ones he loses (strictly higher payo¤when
ties are with a positive number of troops). In order to simplify our analysis we assume
that colonels are never indi¤erent between any two battleelds (including the possibility
of indi¤erence makes our analysis more tedious). When there is no indi¤erence, we can
prove that there can never be multiple pure strategy equilibria.
Lemma 5 Consider a non-zero Colonel Blotto game where colonels never receive the
same payo¤ from any two battleelds (i.e. in 6= im for any n 6= m and for i = 1; 2).
There can be at most a single pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Given a pure strategy equilibrium, Proposition 1 tells us that the equilibrium
deployment prole is reached by our algorithm. Besides, our algorithm reaches a unique
conguration when colonels are never indi¤erent between any two battleelds. It follows
that if an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, it should be unique.
6 It is possible that one of the battleelds may be positively tied. This happens when both colonels
have invested their troops in the same battleeld in the previous iteration of the algorithm.
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In order to characterize the non-zero Colonel Blotto games that contain a (unique) pure
strategy equilibrium it will be convenient to classify such games in terms of the coincidence
of their most preferred battleelds. In this vein we rst dene the set of the k (0 < k < N)
most preferred battleelds by colonel i (i = 1; 2) asM ik. Formally this set can be described
by the following expression:
M ik :=
n
n : in  i(k)
o
where i(k) denotes colonel is k-th most preferred battleeld.
Recall that the algorithm above requires each colonel to distribute a single troop in his
most preferred battleeld among the battleelds that he is not winning. This shows
that as long as the most preferred battleelds of both colonels do not coincide, colonels
place a troop in their most preferred battleeld and win it with the only permissible
troop allocation in a pure strategy equilibrium (recall Lemma 2, battleelds can only be
won 1   0). When their most preferred battleeld (among those that they do not win)
coincide, the algorithm leads to the remainder of their troops being deployed in such
battleeld. The problem arises when one colonels most preferred battleeld coincides
with a battleeld that has already been won by his opponent. In such circumstances no
pure strategy equilibrium will exist.
We say that a non-zero Colonel Blotto game has index  when  is the highest integer
such that the sets of  most preferred battleelds by each colonel are disjoint, i.e.  =
maxfk :M1k \M2k = ;g and  = 0 when M11 \M21 6= ;. The index of any game is always
well dened: greater or equal than 0 and smaller or equal than the integer value of N2 .
For instance, a game with index equal to 0 is one where both colonelsmost preferred
battleeld coincides; a game with an index equal to 1 is one where both colonelsmost
preferred battleelds do not coincide but their second most preferred battleelds coincides
with each other or with the most preferred of their opponent, etc.
With the aid of the index of non-zero Colonel Blotto games we can characterize the de-
ployments achieved by our algorithm. This in turn allows to characterize the games that
have a pure strategy equilibrium. Prior to the statement of our main Proposition we
present two examples that perfectly capture the situations when a pure strategy equilib-
rium exists.
Example 1 Consider a situation where both colonelspayo¤s are: (4; 5; 3) and (9; 2; 1).
If both colonels only have single troop (T = 1) there is indeed an equilibrium where both
colonels deploy that troop in their most preferred battleeld (note that non-zero sum colonel
Blotto games with a single troop (T = 1) always have a pure strategy equilibrium).
Example 2 Now consider a situation where both colonels payo¤s are: (5; 4; 3) and (9; 2; 1).
If both colonels have 3 troops, we have that our algorithm reaches a deployment prole
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where all troops are deployed in the rst battleeld. However, we can see that this does not
constitute an equilibrium because the rst colonel has incentives to divert his troops into
the last two territories. Instead, if his valuation of the last two territories is low enough,
the described deployment prole would be an equilibrium.
As shown in example 1, there always exists an equilibrium whenever T = 1. We are now
ready to state our Proposition that characterizes the valuations of the games which have
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium whenever T > 1.
Proposition 2 Consider a non-zero Colonel Blotto game with T > 1 troops, N battle-
elds and index   0. Assume that colonels never receive the same payo¤ from any two
battleelds. When the number of troops is smaller than or equal to the index (T  k),
there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. When the number of troops is greater than the
index (T > k) there exists a pure strategy equilibrium, if and only if both colonels (+ 1)
most preferred battleeld coincides and the colonels valuation of this battleeld is large
enough.
Proof. When there is a small number of troops (T  ) our algorithm reaches an
allocation in which he wins his  preferred battleelds, loses  other battleelds and ties
the remaining ones. This deployment prole is indeed an equilibrium because each troop
is deployed in the T battleelds that yield the most payo¤ to each colonel.
When there is a large number of troops (T > ) the existence of pure strategy equilib-
rium depends on the (+1) most preferred battleeld of each colonel, i(k+1) for i = 1; 2..
When both colonels (+ 1) most preferred battleeld coincides, the algorithm reaches a
deployment prole in which each colonel deploys a single troop in his  preferred battle-
elds and (T   ) troops in his ( + 1) most preferred battleeld. The outcome of such
a battle has each colonel winning his  most preferred battleelds, tying his (+1) most
preferred battleeld, losing  other battleelds and tying the remainder. This may be a
candidate to pure strategy equilibrium as the deployment prole satises the conditions
in Lemmas 1, 2, and 3. In order to ensure this is an equilibrium we need to check that
there is no protable deviation. We know that each colonel is winning his  most pre-
ferred battleelds with a single troop so there is no incentive to move troops in or out of
those battleelds. The question is whether a colonel is better o¤ by relocating the (T  )
troops deployed in his (+1) most preferred battleeld. These troops can be relocated to
improve the outcome of one of the territories that he ties or loses. We are now ready to
show that there is a lower bound in i(+1) above which the actions described constitute
an equilibrium.
Colonel is deployment prole is such that apart from his (+1)most preferred battleelds,
all battleelds are either lost by one troop or tied. In the former case, two troops are
11
needed to win such territory and in the latter, a single troop su¢ ces. In order to explicitly
describe the lower bound for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist we dene the function
i (n) as
i (n) =
(
1 when the n-th most preferred battleeld of colonel i is tied
2 when the n-th most preferred battleeld of colonel i is lost.
We know that colonel i has a protable deviation when there exists e 2 f1; 2g and
 2 f1; :::; Ng : e   (+ ) and
i(+1)  i (+ 2)  i(+2) + :::+ i (+    1)  i(+ 1) + e  i(+)
where  is such that i (+ 2) + :::+ i (+    1) + e  T   :
In other words, the above formula applies when colonel i can relocate (some or all) of his
troops in his (+1) most preferred battleeld into his next  most preferred battleelds.
This relocation of troops implies that he loses his (+1)most preferred battleeld but wins
   1 battleelds (from being tied or lost) and improves the outcome of his (+ ) most
preferred battleeld (colonel i may not have enough resources to win this last battleeld).
Note that the lower bound on i(+1) not only depends on the number of troops available
(the colonel is relocating at most the (T   ) troops deployed in his (+1) most preferred
battleeld) but also on the particular identity of the  most preferred battleelds by his
opponent.
We now need to look at the case where the colonels(+1) most preferred battleeld does
not coincide. By the denition of the index of the game we know that M1+1 \M2+1 6= ;.
It could be the case that both colonels(+ 1) most preferred battleeld coincides with
one the  most preferred battleelds of his opponent (i.e. i(k+1) 2 M jk ;8i 6= j), or that
this occurs only for one of the colonels.
In the rst case we have that i(k+1) 2 M jk ;8i 6= j. The deployment reached by our
algorithm now depends on whether (T   ) is even or odd. Note that at the stage when
colonel i is deploying his (+ 1) troop, he ties a battleeld he was losing (one of the
 most preferred by his opponent) and the deployment of his opponent implies that a
battleeld he was previously winning is now tied. At the stage when colonel i is deploying
his (+ 2) he wants to deploy the troop in the battleeld that is most preferred to him
among the battleelds that he is not winning. This implies that he will undo the tie just
created by the (+ 1) troop of his opponent. His opponent will do exactly the same,
thus the outcome of this deployment of troops will be identical to the outcome they
obtained after allocating  troops. It thus follows that the following deployment of troops
will simply replicate the outcome of stage (+ 1), and the subsequent deployment will
replicate that of stage (+ 2). Therefore, when (T   ) is odd, the algorithm ends in
the outcome achieved in the (+ 1) stage, and when it is even, it ends in the outcome
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achieved in the (+ 2) stage. Finally, we need to show which of these situations can
constitute a pure strategy Nash equilibrium: the allocation where (T   ) is even is one
where two battleelds are won with strictly more than 1 troop and we know that this
cannot constitute an equilibrium (Lemma 1); the allocation when (T   ) is odd cannot
constitute an equilibrium because two battleelds are tied with one troop per colonel but,
given that colonels are not indi¤erent between any two battleeld, there is a protable
deviation by deploying the troop in the tied battleeld that yields less payo¤ into the tied
territory that yields more payo¤.
In the second case we have that i(k+1) 2 M jk but j(k+1) =2 M ik. The deployment prole
reached by our algorithm implies that colonel i wins all battleelds in M i, colonel j
wins battleelds in M j+1nM i+1 and they both deploy (T   ) in colonel is (+1) most
preferred battleeld. It is immediate to show that this cannot constitute an equilibrium
because colonel j has incentives to deviate the troop deployed in his (+1) most preferred
battleeld into his opponents (+ 1) most preferred battleeld: in this way he improves
his overall payo¤by tying a battleeld he is winning (his (+1) most preferred battleeld)
and wins a battleeld he is tying (on of his  most preferred battleelds).
An immediate corollary follows from the previous proposition.
Corollary 1 Consider a non-zero Colonel Blotto game with T troops and N battleelds.
Assume that the payo¤s to each colonel are independent and identically distributed ac-
cording to a density with full support on [0; 1]. There is a strictly positive probability that
the game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
The proof is immediate because when payo¤s are i.i.d. there is for instance a strictly
positive probability that both colonels equally rank all battleelds and that the rst bat-
tleelds payo¤to each colonel is arbitrarily larger than the payo¤s of the other battleelds.
In such circumstances a pure strategy equilibrium trivially exists. More noteworthy of
highlighting is the probability with which pure strategy equilibria exists increases rapidly
as we increase the number of battleelds (it is easier to nd a situation where the sets of T
most preferred battleelds of each colonels are disjoint) but this probability will decrease
rapidly as we increase the number of troops (it is easier to nd a situation where both
colonels(+ 1) most preferred battleeld coincide).
4 Conclusion
We have characterized the situations under which non-zero sum colonel Blotto games have
pure strategy equilibria. We have done so in three steps. First, we have determined the
admissable actions (deployment proles). Second, we have introduced an algorithm that
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converges to a pure strategy equilibrium when this one exists. And third, we have char-
acterized the set of payo¤s that support pure strategy equilibria. Finally we have stated
that when payo¤s are independent and identically distributed there is always a positive
probability of nding non-zero sum colonel Blotto games with pure strategy equilibria.
We believe that this work only constitutes a rst step towards the full characterization
of equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. These games are not only relevant
in terms of conict games but can also be of use when thinking about the allocation of
resources in voting games, optimal strategies in multi-object auctions, etc.
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